This article will discuss the difficulties of providing a plausible account of rule following in the social realm. It will show that the cognitive model of rule following is not suited for this task. Nevertheless, revealing the inadequacy of the cognitive model does not justify the wholesale dismissal of understanding human practices as rule-following practices, as social theorists like Bourdieu or Dreyfus have argued. Instead it will be shown that rule-following behavior is best understood as being based on a set of complex dispositions. In this manner one is able to account for the causal explanatory role of the notion of a rule.
INTRODUCTION
It seems to be a platitude to point out that the social realm is the realm of rules whereas nature is the realm of natural laws and brute regularities. Only the behavior of human agents, especially in a social setting, is bound and guided by rules, and because of this feature their behavior can be normatively evaluated as right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, and rational or irrational. It is part of the education of every child at home and in school to be taught the rules of the "game" in order to become a productive member of society. Social scientists, historians, and anthropologists are thus prima facie well advised to study the normative standards of a particular society because it is in light of these standards that they are able to explain why individual members of that society act the way they do; why they drive on the right side of the road instead of the left or why they eat with knives and forks instead of their hands.
Despite the intuitive plausibility of this methodological advice, the notion of a rule has fallen distinctively out of favor for certain social theorists such as Bourdieu or philosophers of social science such as Dreyfus and Searle. They all agree that the notion of a rule cannot do any explanatory work insofar as individual agents are concerned, because we cannot make consistent sense of the idea of how rules can guide an individual's behavior. Instead of talking of rules they prefer talking about nonpropositional and inarticulatable basic skills (Dreyfus) , the background (Searle) , or the habitus (Bourdieu) . In the following, I will discuss their skepticism in regard to the notion of a rule. First, I will consider the difficulty facing the task of providing a plausible account of the notion of a rule in the context of explicating human agency in the social realm. I will also show why the cognitive model of rule following is not suited for this task. Nevertheless, revealing the inadequacy of the cognitive model does not justify a wholesale dismissal of understanding human practices as rule-following practices. Rule-following behavior is best understood as being based on a set of complex dispositions that include a second-order disposition to monitor one's behavior for its normative appropriateness. In light of this conception of rule following, one is also able to account for the causal explanatory role of the notion of a rule, a problem that has been central in the development of the cognitive model of rule following.
PROBLEMS WITH THE COGNITIVE MODEL OF RULE FOLLOWING
Knowing the rules of a society typically allows us to predict how people will act in certain social settings. Yet as we have learned from the philosophical critique of Hempel's model of explanation, merely being justified in predicting an event e is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for possessing a causal explanation of why that event occurred. Rather, an event e can be causally explained only in light of information about causal relevant properties of prior events that help to bring it about, at least on the model of explanation that I have strong sympathies for. Consequently, if rules are to serve any causal explanatory function, we have to understand how rules are causally relevant for bringing about human actions. Normally we express the causal relevance of rules by saying that they guide the behavior of the individual or that individuals follow certain 308 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / September 2005 rules.
1 If rules were indeed the intentional object of our beliefs and desires, we could easily understand the causal relevance of rules, since within the folk-psychological context we typically accept that agents act because of their beliefs and desires.
2 Rules, however, seem to mold the behavior of individuals without necessarily being the object of their conscious beliefs and desires. Professors, for example, will not typically scream at their students in their classrooms even though they do not consciously deliberate about whether they should do such a thing each time they go to class. They have better things to think about.
The causal power of rules becomes even more mysterious if one considers linguistic rules that philosophers and linguists have focused on or the rules that anthropologists within the structuralist paradigm talk about, since such rules are beyond the conceptual grasp of ordinary folks. They are regarded to be a part of the deep structure of language or culture that can be revealed only through logical analysis by professional linguists or anthropologists. Durkheim would regard such rules as being a part of what he calls "social facts." Rules thus exist independent of the manifestation in the rule-following behavior or conscious deliberation of the individual agent, yet they somehow are "endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him."
3
In his The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim appeals to the notion of a "collective consciousness" in order to explicate the causal powers of social facts. Unfortunately he fails to explain how a collective consciousness is able to causally regulate individual behavior.
Stueber / RULES AND RULE FOLLOWING 309 1. Social scientists are obviously well advised to ask why individuals follow certain rules since the acceptance of rules within a society might indicate underlying relations of power. I admit that a mere strategic relationship to certain rules is possible. I thus do not act because of the rule but because of the sanction associated with violating the rule. Nevertheless I do not regard a mere strategic relationship to normative standards as primary. I would be inclined to argue that insofar as we conceive ourselves as rational and linguistic beings (who are capable of rational and strategic manipulation of certain rules), we also have to regard a nonstrategic relationship to rules as basic. More importantly, I focus on this conception of rule following because it is the focus of the challenge that I am discussing.
2. Having said this, I do not want to diminish the seriousness of the philosophical problem of mental causation to which we commit ourselves in folk-psychological explanations. For my stance on this problem and a response to Kim's powerful explanatory exclusion argument, see my article "Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation" in Philosophical Studies (Stueber 2005) .
3. Durkheim (1938, 3) .
We therefore need a psychologically more plausible account of how rules can play a causal role in the production of human behavior, unless of course one is willing to endow rules with a causal power sui generis. 4 Moreover, rules do not merely have a causal impact on the behavior of individual agents. They are also functioning as normative standards for the evaluation of an agent's behavior in a particular situation, either for the justification of an action by the agent himself or for the evaluation from the perspective of other agents. Without a rule playing a certain role in the production of the individual's behavior by "guiding" the individual in the "choice" between a multitude of possible behavioral alternatives, it becomes difficult to understand why rules should have a normative force that is not an external imposition of a standard foreign to a particular practice such as when one judges the moves of a baseball player according to the rules of soccer or even less sensibly judges the "behavior" of an inanimate object as having made a mistake.
The problem of the notion of a rule is thus twofold. One has to account for the causal efficacy on the individual's behavior and one has to explain it in a manner that rules can also be conceived of as normative standards for the evaluation of the behavior. Social theorists and philosophers tried to solve this problem by suggesting that agents have psychologically internalized social rules either because of social conditioning and training or because of our innate psychological endowment given to us by Mother Nature. Rules play a causal role because they are internally represented in our cognitive system without the agent having necessarily conscious access to such internal representations. In the first half of the 20th century this cognitive model of rule following was particularly inspired by Freudian insights. Accordingly, our actions are partly controlled by cognitive systems on the subpersonal level. Within the Freudian framework such subpersonal cognitive systems are conceived of as being like little agents or homunculi in that their activities are still explained in terms of beliefs and desires. These systems would act because they understand rules, they desire to follow rules, and they know that a certain kind of action is demanded by the rule in a certain situation. 4. Whereas our scientific conception of the world certainly allows for brute force causation that cannot be explained in terms of underlying causal mechanisms, it does so only at the fundamental microphysical level. All other causal power is regarded to be dependent on underlying causal mechanisms. The homunculi account of rule following is however fundamentally incomplete. It fails to explain how a rule determines what action is called for in a specific situation. Since each rule has to be formulated on some level of generality it is in need of an interpretation in order to be applied to the specific case. If the conception of the above model of the human mind is correct we would need to appeal to another subpersonal system that is also guided by beliefs and desires and further interpretive rules in order to account for such interpretation. The problem of how a rule could be correctly applied to a particular case would therefore arise over and over again ad infinitum. Only in light of the computer model of the mind-according to which the mind is a symbol-crunching machine guided by a program of rules-did the cognitive model of rule following become psychologically more plausible. Within this model, internal representations of rules still play a causal role in the production of behavior. Yet the computer model allows us to understand how such internal representations can play such a role without the interpretive or intentional activity of a subpersonal system. Representations of rules causally "guide" the behavior of agents insofar as they are in the end defined over simple operations that an organism or a machine is "hard-wired" to follow. At the lowest level of organization the infinite regress of interpretation and rules is blocked because rules are not defined in terms of other rules but directly in terms of simple behavioral procedures. 6 Nevertheless, the cognitive model of rule following does encounter serious difficulties that make it questionable whether it can adequately address the twofold problem associated with the notion of a rule. It is doubtful whether the cognitive model can be of any help in accounting for social agency, since it is unable to address satisfactorily the following three problems, which I will call the normativity worry, the frame problem, and the methodological quandary. First, the normativity worries that have been prominent in Wittgenstein's later philosophy:
7 according to these considerations, having mental representations of rules that play a certain causal role is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for a rule to serve as the normative standard for the evaluation of behavior. The cognitive model fails to explain Stueber / RULES AND RULE FOLLOWING 311 (1964) . According to Parsons even Durkheim argued for a similar model in his later work. Consult also Parsons (1951, chs. 6 and 7).
6. For a short overview of this problem see Sterelny (1990, 32-40) and Dennett (1981, 119-25) .
7. See especially Wittgenstein's remarks on reading in Philosophical Investigations §156-58. why the agent himself should regard the internal rule automatically as a suitable normative standard for the evaluation of his behavior. Such a claim is plausible only if mental representations of rules would constitute the content of his conscious or unconscious desires. Only then would the rule also describe conditions of satisfaction for this desire that would allow us to understand the rule as a normative standard explicating what would count as satisfying this desire. However, within the computer model of the mind it is not possible that every rule can be part of a propositional attitude. Furthermore, an internal representation of a rule is not even necessary for a rule to serve as a normative standard. While we certainly know how to program a computer to play chess, it is imaginable to build connectionist systems that play chess without any chess rules being directly represented within the internal architecture of the system. We indeed might be such systems. Intuitively we nevertheless would say that both chess-playing systems-regardless of their internal organization-should be evaluated according to the rules of chess.
The above normativity worries however have never been the central concerns for critics of the cognitive model of rule following like Dreyfus, Searle, or Bourdieu in the context of the philosophy of social science. What has come to be called the frame problem has been more important in this context, especially for Dreyfus's early rejection of the artificial intelligence (AI) paradigm. 8 Dreyfus is quite aware of the fact that the above cognitive model solves the general problem of an infinite regress of interpretation. Machines as envisioned within the AI framework are thus not "transcendentally stupid," but they are nevertheless "existentially stupid in that they cannot cope with specific situations"; 9 that is, they are not able to mirror the flexibility and effortlessness of human intelligence in dealing with real-life problems. Rules of a computer program have to be defined over discrete 312 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / September 2005 8. Dreyfus however muddies the water in his publications. Besides the emphasis on the frame problem one also finds arguments critical of cognitive science that are derived from considerations of the first person perspective. According to this line of thought only the beginner consciously consults the rules of a game while the expert leaves considerations of rules completely behind. His embodied skills allow him to respond directly to a situation in an appropriate manner. These arguments are not pertinent against the cognitive science paradigm. They confuse the question of how a particular skill is implemented or internally organized with the question of how the expert himself conceives of his skill. See, for example, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986, ch. 1) .
9. Dreyfus (1972, 113) . This distinction is not always sufficiently made in Dreyfus's writing. See, for example, Dreyfus (1980, 8-9) . For the following, see particularly Dreyfus (1972, ch. 6 ) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986, 79ff.) . and context-free elements of a particular situation. Human cognitive capacities, however, whether they concern our ability to understand linguistic utterances, the epistemic justification of a particular belief, or the deliberation about which action to pursue next, are essentially context dependent. They require us to recognize the relevant features of a particular situation in light of our general knowledge of the world and the particular context we find ourselves in. As Jerry Fodor puts it, the frame problem arises because in "classical machines the basic architectural as well as the basic computational processes are local," but "there appear to be mental processes that . . . respond to (irreducibly) nonlocal properties of belief systems."
10 To modify an example of Dreyfus, we normally understand the sentence "The parachute is in the pen" as asserting that the parachute is in the playpen of a child, given our knowledge of the relative sizes of playpens and parachutes. Yet in the context of a James Bond movie we effortlessly understand it as referring to the parachute in the writing utensil ingeniously devised in the laboratory of the British Secret Service, because this interpretation coheres better with what we know about the world and James Bond movies.
11 A machine can certainly "recognize" that the word "pen" has more than one meaning, as different meanings can be linked to a local property such as the syntactical shape of the word "pen." In defining a program for disambiguating the meaning of the word "pen" in a specific context one would have to use a rule that refers to global properties of our cognitive system like, for example, "choose the interpretation that coheres best with the relevant knowledge of the world." In order to program a machine accordingly, it is necessary that we computationally define a precise theory of relevance so that the machine can determine the relevant aspects of a specific situation. It is however empirically highly unlikely that such a definition is possible within the paradigm of "good old-fashioned AI." Any attempt to implement a general theory of relevance presupposes a precise understanding of how one decides what part of a "global theory of relevance" is relevant for a local context. And such understanding would again depend on the ability to recognize certain global features of our belief system and not merely specific local properties in terms of which we are able to articulate a programmable rule for a computer.
Stueber / RULES AND RULE FOLLOWING 313 10. Fodor (2000, 45) . 11. Dreyfus (1972, 127ff.) . Similar examples feature prominently in Searle's arguments for the background. See Searle (1983, 145ff.; 1992, 178ff.) .
Moreover, the cognitive model of rule following runs into serious methodological quandaries. As Bourdieu, following Quine, remarks, it is prone to confusing between a model of reality and the reality of the model or, in "Marx's well known phrase," to confusing "'the things of logic as the logic of things'."
12 More specifically, within the cognitive model it is not clear under what condition we are justified to assume that a rule or a principle that describes an observed practice empirically adequately is also represented internally or is somehow tacitly known to the agent. This quandary is particularly acute since it seems to be the case that we could come up with different systems of rules that describe a particular practice empirically adequately. Which of the many empirically adequate systems of rules should we assume are internalized by the agent? Why should we assume that the agent has internalized any of those systems? As various critics have pointed out, to speak of tacit knowledge or more neutrally of an internal representation of rules in order to explain our ability of riding a bike, skiing, or walking in the upright position is certainly unnecessary. 13 Even if we can describe these abilities according to a complicated mathematical formula, it is bad science to suggest that each cyclist is tacitly an ingenious mathematician. This seems to be as preposterous as asserting that a falling rock tacitly knows the laws of gravity that describe the properties of its fall. Bourdieu (1977, 27ff.; 1990b, 48 and 61; 1990a, 39) . See also Quine (1972) . 13. See for this critique Pleasant (1999, 72ff.) . Schatzki (1996, 50ff .) expresses a similar critique of the notion of a rule. Nevertheless Schatzki continues to use the notion of a rule later on. See, for example, Schatzki (1996, 100) . In my opinion it is not fully clear how this appeal to the notion of a rule is consistent with his earlier critique of it. In any case, it seems to me as if the analysis of rule following as complex and reflective dispositions that I develop in this article might be of some help in this context. 14. Admittedly these last remarks cannot be regarded to constitute the last word against the empirical usefulness of the concept of tacit knowledge of rules. Within contemporary philosophy of mind and linguistics, there have been attempts to address the above worries. For a brief introduction into such attempts, see Davies and Stone (2001, 147-55 and n. 14) for further bibliographical references. According to Davies and Stone, one can make sense of the notion of tacit knowledge of a rule if one understands it as "a state that figures in a common causal explanation of a battery of representation-torepresentation transitions that conform to the rule" (2001, 154) . However, even if such a notion of tacit knowledge would make sense from a metaphysical point of view, I doubt that it would be of any help to the practicing social theorist. Moreover, even if one admits that we know a rule tacitly in this sense, it still does not help us to understand how the cognitive model is able to address the other two problems. Finally, it seems that according to this model of rule following we could have tacit knowledge of rules without any conceptual awareness, tacitly or otherwise, of the rule in question. I find this
PRACTICAL KNOW-HOW WITHOUT THE DISAPPEARANCE OF RULE FOLLOWING
One is in my opinion therefore justified in claiming that the cognitive model does not provide us with an understanding of conditions that are necessary or sufficient in order for practices to count as rulefollowing practices. Bourdieu, Dreyfus, and Searle are therefore intent to account for human practices without the concept of a rule. Instead of rules they emphasize theoretically nonreducible practical capacities and nonpropositional know-how in order to explain the observed regularity of particular social practices. 15 Bourdieu's notion of habitus is in this context certainly the most elaborated notion of such practical know-how. For Bourdieu, practices have to be explained in terms of an embodied but nonrepresentational sense of the "feel for the game," which allows the agent to act appropriately in the world. The habitus is the "set of structured and structuring dispositions" (Bourdieu 1990a, 53 ) that provides us with schemes of perceiving the world we live in and that also provides us with the appropriate emotional reaction to the world in its infinite variety. Here one might, for example, think of our ability to stand at a right distance from our partner in conversation, to know what clothes to wear for particular occasions, and to know how to engage in small talk at a dinner party, but more importantly one should also think of a whole range of what Strawson calls our reactive attitudes towards other persons, such as being angry, being insulted, feeling ashamed, and being proud at the appropriate times and situations.
Bourdieu often suggests that the agents' "feel for the game" has nothing to do with the rules of the particular game that they are playing or the way a coach would analyze the moves of the game afterwards. 16 Here I think Bourdieu draws the wrong lesson from the failStueber / RULES AND RULE FOLLOWING 315 implausible especially insofar as the practice of rule following within the social context is concerned. In the end these issues raise important questions about the relation between personal-level properties and subpersonal mechanisms and whether the existence of personal-level properties implies an isomorphic mapping between personallevel phenomena and subpersonal mechanisms. These vexing topics are however beyond the scope of this article. 15. For a better understanding of the differences between Searle and Dreyfus in conceiving of the background of nonpropositional capacities, see Searle's article and Dreyfus's response in Wrathall and Malpas (2000) . Also illuminating in this respect is Wrathall's contribution to the same anthology.
16. Bourdieu (1990b, 11; 1990a, 91) .
ure of the cognitive and representational model of rule following.
While it certainly was a mistake to try to understand our ability to ride a bike in terms of rules, it is an equally grave mistake to view all human practices in analogy to bike riding or being able to walk in the upright position. Giving up on the notion of a rule implies that it is impossible to account for the fact that in contrast to bike riding, human practices tend to be normatively structured. Holding on to the notion of a rule is important because only in this manner can we understand why the agents themselves accept normative evaluations of their behavior as being appropriate, why they can rationally discuss the appropriateness of their behavior, and why recognizing a violation of a normative standard can be a reason for changing their behavior. Searle seems to understand that rules have to be given some place in our understanding of normative practices, without succumbing to the temptation that agents consciously or unconsciously follow rules according to the cognitive model. 17 Otherwise human practices would have to be regarded as mere habits that show a certain regularity, but could not be seen as practices "that respond to norms or demands."
18 For Searle, however, rules do not play any causal role in the mental economy of individual agents. Rules play a causal and explanatory role only because they can be invoked in explaining why individual agents in social settings have acquired certain dispositions or cognitive mechanisms that are "sensitive to the rules." 19 Nevertheless, Searle's account leaves the causal power of rules in the end unexplained. It also does not explicate how rules can at the same time function as normative standards for a particular practice. Consider, for example, the following quote by Searle.
A good anthropologist might come up with the rules of baseball just by describing the behavior of these people and what they regard as normative in baseball situations. But it does not follow from the accuracy of the anthropological description that members of this society are consciously or unconsciously following these rules. Nonetheless, those rules do play a crucial role in the explanation of their behavior, because they have acquired the dispositions that they have, precisely because those are the rules of baseball. 17. Searle (1995, 137-47) . 18. Taylor (1999, 38) . 19. See also M. Risjord (2000, ch. 7) for a more extensive explication of this position. 20. Searle (1995, 145) .
Nothing in Searle's analysis guarantees that the rules that the anthropologist comes up with are the rules that caused the "native" to acquire certain dispositions. Even though such formulation of rules might be sufficient for the anthropologist to learn the native's game, what justifies the assumption that his formulation explicates the rules that caused the native to learn the game, since there might be multiple and equivalent rule formulations possible? Furthermore, why should we assume that rules play any causal role in the acquisition of certain dispositions, even if an outsider might come up with the empirically adequate formulations of such rules? As an alternative, one could think that a "feel for the game" could be acquired without reference to any rules by mere imitation and mimicry of the behavior of those who are already competent players of the game (as Bourdieu sometimes suggests). 21 Certainly accents, ways of walking and talking, and even certain facial expressions are acquired in this manner; why not driving on the right side of the road? Children have the admirable quality of learning how to do things by just being put in the middle of things. They learn how to ride a bicycle, how to ski, or the use of certain tools in this manner. Indeed if we believe the result of recent research in developmental psychology, imitation is nature's way of solving the other minds problem and of allowing children to become socially competent and "knowledgeable" without any sophisticated theoretical instructions.
22 Under this scenario, any appeal to rules would indeed be explanatorily empty. Rules would be a mere construct of the outsider. It would also not necessarily have anything to do with how the agents themselves conceive of their practice. Searle's notion of a rule encounters thus the same problems as the cognitive model that he opposes.
In order to make some progress towards solving this intricate problem I will take my cues from Peter Winch and especially Anthony Giddens, who emphasizes the reflexive character of human agents who monitor the actions they "display and expect others to display."
23
Here one certainly has to tread very carefully, since Giddens himself is regarded by some to be a proponent of the cognitive model of rule following. 24 Some of his remarks seem to imply that he thinks of a rule as being somehow tacitly represented by the agent and then accessed in the process of reflection. This is however not the manner in which I Stueber / RULES AND RULE FOLLOWING 317 21. See also S. Turner (1994 Turner ( , 2000 . 22. See especially Meltzoff and Brooks (2001 ). 23. A. Giddens (1984 , 3). 24. See, for example, Nigel Pleasant (1999 read him, but I am not primarily interested in Giddens' exegesis. For the sake of avoiding confusion I will stay away from the terminology of tacit knowledge. I propose merely that we conceive of agents as following rules if and only if the agent himself has some understanding of the fact that his behavior can be normatively evaluated and that he can stand corrected in light of certain normative standards that he acknowledges as being relevant for such evaluations. For this purpose however rules do not have to be represented in the cognitive system of the agent; they have only to be appealed to or articulated by agents when questions of the normative appropriateness of their behavior arise or become a topic of direct discourse.
These abstract considerations might become clearer by reconsidering the case of playing a game. Even though it does not make sense to say that a chess or soccer player explicitly or implicitly considers the constitutive rules of chess in deliberating about his next move-rules in that sense do not constitute reasons for his actions-nevertheless the players themselves appeal to those rules when a violation occurs. They complain to the referee for overlooking a foul or they get angry for not getting the penalty kick they worked so hard to get. Furthermore certain strategies like the off-site trap would be impossible to understand without attributing knowledge of the off-site rule to the players. For that reason Bourdieu insufficiently analyzes the conditions under which we attribute a feel for the game to somebody. Not only players need a feel for the game, but the same is also true of referees and coaches. Or, to say it differently, players have a feel for the game because they are at the same time participants and referees of the game, and in being their own referees they constitute their activity as a rule-following activity.
While the game analogy is helpful to bring out the reflexive character that constitutes a rule-following practice, it can however be misleading in other respects. Players of a game are normally able to formulate the rules they are following. Such ability however is not implied in my account of rule following. Making the possibility of a reflexive attitude constitutive for rule following only implies that agents have to have some conceptual awareness of or have some potential for conceptually articulating the rule they are following. As Winch suggests, it is not necessary for living according to the rule of honesty that one is able to define honesty in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Yet one has to have some comprehension of this concept and its alternative, that is, dishonesty.
25 For that purpose, it 318 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / September 2005 25. See Winch (1958, 57-65) .
might be sufficient that one is able to point to paradigmatic situations that are providing standards for the evaluation of behavior. DeSousa for example suggests that our understanding of the appropriateness of an emotional response functions exactly in this manner. For him, "paradigm situations involve two aspects: first a paradigm situation providing the characteristic objects of the emotions . . . and second, a set of characteristic or 'normal' responses to the situation." 26 The evaluation of the appropriateness of an emotional response consists thus in the comparison of the degree of "fit" between the paradigm situation and the actual situation in which the emotional response occurred. In this manner one should also conceive of our practice of standing at a right distance to one's conversational partner, an example that is often mentioned by critics of the cognitive model of rule following. We normally are not aware of the fact that we are following certain rules in this respect. But what makes our social skill a practice of rule following is the fact that I recognize normative violations of such a rule because my conversational partner might come too close to me compared to what I am normally used to. It is in such moments that I am also able to recognize my practice as following the rule of standing at a correct distance.
I therefore agree with Bourdieu, Dreyfus, and Searle that agents do not follow rules just because they have an internal representation of the rule in their head. Yet they also do not follow rules, as Searle suggests, only because they have some first-order dispositions that can be described from the outside as being in accordance with or as being sensitive to certain rules. Searle cannot explain why we should regard these dispositions as being acquired because of the rules and why such an external articulation of the rules should be regarded as articulation of normative standards that are intrinsic to an agent's practice. First-order dispositions merely establish a regularity of behavior. Critics of the cognitive model of rule following fall short because they try to analyze the complexity of our normative practices in terms of first-order dispositions of being able to act in a regular manner. If I am right, agents can be understood as following rules if and only if agents have acquired certain complex dispositions that not only include firstorder dispositions of showing regularity of behavior but also involve reflective capacities or second-order dispositions to monitor one's response for its correctness or appropriateness. Such higher order dispositions are normally only actualized in a situation in which the appropriateStueber / RULES AND RULE FOLLOWING 319 26. R. DeSousa (1986, 182, 142) .
ness of one's behavior becomes an issue. They are not ordinarily involved in causing behavior in unproblematic cases.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above conception of rule following also allows us to explicate the causal explanatory power of rule talk. To say that somebody shoots the ball only with his feet because it is a rule of soccer not to touch the ball with one's hand (except when one is the goalkeeper), means that he acts because of a certain complex self-monitoring disposition. The agent or player himself would have to be disposed to acknowledge in certain situations that touching the ball with the hand counts as a violation of a normative standard. 27 Regarding the role of "rules" in the acquisition of dispositions, I would suggest the following story. We should regard imitation of examples as playing a primary role in the acquisition of certain abilities. In acquiring rulefollowing practices we however do not merely acquire first-order dispositions but also acquire complex self-monitoring dispositions that are sensitive to the violation of normative standards. In order to strengthen the reflective element of our complex dispositions, we normally support the acquisition of such dispositions by formulating explicit rules or by pointing out violations of normative standards. To speak of rules as causing individuals to have certain dispositions can thus be understood as referring to a process in which we acquire reflexive dispositions through imitation of and through more explicit teaching by already competent members of a practice.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / September 2005
27. I therefore regard David Henderson's contribution to this journal as complementing my account (Henderson, this issue). I would also like to emphasize that I do not provide a constructive answer to Kripke's rule skepticism. I do not think that such an answer is possible or necessary, since I regard such a skeptical stance towards rules to be pragmatically inconsistent. See Stueber (1993, ch. 4; . I thus do not provide a reductive dispositional account of rule following, since the higher order dispositions I am talking about are irreducibly soaked with normative notions. I understand myself as providing a conceptual illumination of the nature of rule following in the context of our practices where normativity is taken for granted. Here, I do not have the space to compare my account with Pettit's complex dispositional account of rule following. Pettit understand himself as providing an indirect answer to Kripke's skeptical considerations. He also insists that rule following requires an intention to follow the rule. I would disagree with Pettit on both accounts. See Pettit (1993, ch. 2) and the relevant articles in Pettit (2002).
Notice, however, that my account does not encounter the above normativity worry or methodological quandary, since it is essential for my conception that the agent's perspective itself is taken as central for our conception of rule-following behavior. Regardless of how agents' minds are internally organized, agents are "guided" by rules insofar as they can acknowledge them as standards for the evaluations of their behavior. For that very reason the first person perspective has also to be adequately taken into account in a philosophically appropriate conception of the epistemology of explaining agency. Even though it is not a very popular position to entertain in contemporary hermeneutic and Wittgensteinian circles, the foregoing considerations lend support to the position of good old-fashioned philosophers of history such as Collingwood who emphasize that empathy or reenactment is epistemologically central for understanding human agency. 28 This however is a topic for another time. Having the correct conception of rule following has to suffice for the moment. 
